In this paper we present an approach for the integration of cybersecurity tools from multiple domains into an overall risk assessment framework which takes the complex interactions between domains in smart grid systems into account. e approach is based on generating hypotheses from a template, which are then analyzed for their probability and associated impact on the system. e feasibility of the proposed approach is discussed using a very simple example case to serve as a proof of concept. Furthermore, we introduce a generic so ware framework for the processing of hypothesis templates.
INTRODUCTION
e operation of electrical distribution grids, as seen from the utility control center, is centered around the SCADA and DMS systems in place. In practice this means that the operator in the control center achieves situational awareness about the state of the physical infrastructure through a combination of online monitoring and partly o ine decision support tools available in the control center. e severity of threats to power system security of supply is evaluated continuously, quanti ed by assessment tools that integrate operational data delivered by the SCADA system with background Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for pro t or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the rst page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permi ed. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior speci c permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. knowledge on the present system con guration. Examples of such tools are state estimators, contingency screening and real-time security indicators.
In a di erent context, but similar situation, utilities have increasingly been facing cyber-threats and a acks on the ICT backbones of the systems named above. Utilities have increasingly engaged in building cyber-oriented active and passive defense mechanisms and infrastructure, to keep (at least) the central OT safe from external threats. A deeper understanding of possible penetration depth in the utility IT and OT systems can be achieved by architecture assessment systems (such as CySeMoL). Such and other tools facilitate proactive defense-in-depth strategies on the eld of cybersecurity threats and countermeasures. However, it is not trivial to assess the potential impact of cyber a acks on the security of supply.
Considering increasing frequency and sophistication of a acks, it cannot be assumed that the central operational systems will always be safe, even with continuously improving cyber defenses. It is evident that cyber a acks aimed at physical supply disruptions are not only imaginable, but a real possibility [23] .
e point of departure for the present work is the understanding that utilities in the near future need to be able to assess the potential impact on the security of supply caused by cyber a acks. Furthermore, operators need to respond quickly -ideally in real time -to new threats as they appear. To be able to do this, new tools are needed to map out and prioritize their response to these threats.
is need is becoming more pronounced due to the proliferation of smart grid technologies, i.e. a trend towards a higher degree of automation in the power grid and the deployment of automation solutions in areas of the grid which were previously not connected to communication networks, such as customer meters, building automation systems and the control of distributed energy resources (DER). While power grids and the ICT systems needed for their operation have traditionally been treated as separate infrastructures, smart grids have to be analyzed as cyber-physical systems. Consequently, IT security is only one aspect of the cybersecurity of smart grids.
e SALVAGE project aims at developing and integrating analysis methods which are behind three domain-speci c tools. ey provide a quanti cation of cybersecurity vulnerability, probability of an ongoing intrusion and power system impact. One key challenge is how to combine these three types of information, which are of very diverse nature, into an integrated analysis of the present system state. Another challenge is how to go about stepwise automation of such an analysis, in the light of the very large amounts of data which need to be analysed.
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In this paper, we present an approach based on automated hypothesis testing. We discuss the premises and core concepts of the chosen approach, then present an example for a very simple cyber-physical system as a proof of concept. Finally, we discuss the implementation of the concept in a so ware framework, the development of which has been one of the activities in the SALVAGE project. We conclude with a brief discussion of the next steps to be taken.
RELATED WORK
e cyber-physical systems perspective has received increasing a ention from the smart grids community [10, 17] . e range of approaches includes purely analytical methods to a ack detection [13] , system modelling and (co-)simulation [9] , formal methods for security assessment [3] or test speci cation [21] .
Anomaly detection identi es rare data instances or events that do not match an expected pa ern [2] . e development of models used for anomaly detection requires domain expertise, and additionally, if data driven models are required, data analysis knowledge. Modelbased approaches for anomaly detection can be based on Bayesian networks [7] . Once both cyber and physical anomaly detection analysis is performed, cyber-physical metrics need to be developed to combine the information from both domains and address the tight relations between the power system and the ICT domains. Anomaly detection with regression models has been used for discovering cyber a acks on a SCADA system [20] , wind turbine fault detection [22] and photovoltaic plant fault diagnostics [14] . A special case of an a ack against voltage control in distribution power grids has been described in [5] .
A number of methods can be used to assess the cyber-vulnerability of IT and OT architectures such as those enabling the automated control and operation of the smart grid. Examples include methods for traditional human-performed information security risk asseessments (e.g., FAIR [18] or HMG IA [11] ), and risk assessments tailored for the smart grid (e.g., SGIS Toolbox [1] ). ere also exist approaches and tools to automate vulnerability assessment, mostly based on a ack graphs [6, 15] , such as MulVAL [12] , ADVISE [8] , CyberSAGE [19] or CySeMoL [4, 16] . Many of the established and standardized methods for risk assessment are being used in the industry, and can lead to accurate results when used by skilled professionals. However, their use requires much e ort each time an assessment is being performed. e a ack graph based approaches are less labor-intensive, since much of the analysis is performed by a computer; however, tend to require a human to formulate the ontology of how a acks may happen (i.e., a ack steps, transitions between them, and dependencies of the transitions). CySeMoL has the advantage of being such an ontology, aiming to be comprehensive, generic, and even having undergone scienti c scrutiny. Hence, it has been chosen as one of the tools used by the framework presented below.
PROPOSED APPROACH
Traditionally, and from the point of view of a control room operator in an electrical power system, the ICT aspect of the power system (which includes the SCADA and DMS systems) has not been part of the system to be operated; it was an infrastructure which was assumed to work. Today, the ICT domain (both OT and IT) is explicitly taken into account during operations. However, the pure ICT risk assessment still tends to separate security relevant events from ICT and physical domains. Our approach assumes an operational context in which the risk of several cyber-security breaches are evaluated at the same time, and where there is highly uncertain information about possible security breaches. In such a context only an integrated assessment is meaningful, where a riskoriented prioritization of potential threats and impacts is required to accommodate probabilistic information.
Background
Cross-dependencies between domains make it hard to isolate the impact analysis of the physical and cyber domains. Consequences of IT-domain breaches which manifest themselves in the physical domain, are not quanti able using the same metrics as a pure analysis of the IT domain. Furthermore, the model types and propagation mechanisms are di erent in each of these domains. Di erent propagation mechanisms make a direct model integration impossible; a coupling of models could however be achieved, similar to the strategy for co-simulation approaches. A pure co-simulation based assessment would however require a full model parametrization, simulation of combined models and result assessment. Probabilistic input hypotheses and dependencies would still not be feasible in such an approach. Nevertheless, the good success of probabilistic modeling in -for example -intrusion detection or ICT architecture assessment (CySeMol), indicates that uncertain knowledge from several domains can successfully be combined. A ack modeling methods based on probabilistic methods and tree structure are quite successful [6] .
However, a ack probability alone does not constitute su cient information if the goal is to be able to prioritize the response to several a ack scenarios. e impact quantity, i.e. the consequence of an a ack in terms of the physical system, is of equal importance. Calculating the overall risk of a particular a ack scenario (as a function of probability and potential impact) cannot be done without integrating an impact analysis into the vulnerability analysis process, which is necessarily domain-speci c.
Problem Statement: Key requirements
We see a need for a framework that performs a real time (online) integrated assessment of the state of the power grid, using aspects from multiple domains (power system impact, intrusion detection, cyber vulnerability) and multiple sources of input (power system measurements, distributed energy resources (DERs), IT and OT systems) -a framework that aims to provide a joint prioritization of possible threat/impact-scenarios, taking into account uncertainty of input information.
We see that an automated, integrated assessment has the potential to yield more accurate results than performing several separate assessments whose results need to be interpreted and nally merged and synthesized by a human.
e strength of the integrated assessment resides in (1) the possibility to handle dependencies that cross boundaries of di erent domains in an automated fashion and already during the assessment process; and hence (2) the ability of the framework to operate in real time (online assessment), and therefore the ability to provide frequent re-assessments based on an actual state of the power grid and its IT/OT infrastructure.
Core Concepts Figure 1: Domain interactions
e System con guration is the model of the underlying system that is being evaluated -including the power grid, distributed energy resources a ached to it, and all relevant pieces of IT/OT infrastructure that govern and/or otherwise interact with any and all of the former.
e term Domain, in the context of this paper, is referring to one of the following: cyber security/vulnerability, DER intrusion detection, or power system [impact] analysis. Figure 1 shows the relationships between the domains, expressed in terms of the possible ows of information between them. A Domain-speci c assessment (DSA) is a quanti cation (function) obtained from a computational component. For a given input parametrization, the DSA quanti es one or several (branching!) pairs of a probability (p) and a di erent quantity (a Domain speci c variable, e.g. electric current, operating state, switch state). e input parametrization may include both static parameters (e.g. system con gurations), dynamic online data (e.g. meter readings), and other [dynamic] invocation parameters (e.g. state of a particular switch or function). Example: e.g. given a certain state to occur (DER on or o ), what is the quantitative impact (power distribution), and what is the chance of it occcuring.
Domain speci c variable (DSV) is a quantity (an intermediate or nal impact value, e.g. electric current) that is speci c to a DSA, and can be obtained by the DSA, and may be a (partial) input parametrization of another DSA.
A Hypothesis template is a tree-like structural representation (strictly taken, an acyclic directed graph) of the following:
(1) An "a ack tree" in form of a probability tree using logical gates, which aggregates probabilistic data from DSA inputs at its leaf level all the way up to the top-level probability of the assessed realism of a hypothesized scenario;
(2) A set of domain-speci c variables (DSVs, e.g. power supply loss due to opening of a speci c breaker) related to a system con guration -the "output quantities" of DSAs, which, according to the structure of the hypothesis template, ultimately contribute to the risk value (the aggregated product of partial probabilities and impacts) of the hypothesized scenario. e DSVs can be de ned together with an "input parameterization" of a DSA, since the DSA might need to be dynamically invoked with the output parameters of another DSA (instead of the baseline system con guration); (3) e coupling of output probabilities of each DSA to the probability tree (through logical gates such as AND, OR, XOR and NOT); (4) e coupling of DSA outputs with invocations of other DSAs (at a higher level in the tree), leading to a nal scenario quanti cation.
e Risk node is a node used as the root node of a hypothesis template, joining the nal impact quantity (associated with an a ack goal) with the nal hypothesis probability into a single, overall risk value of the (grounded) hypothesis.
A Risk belief is the quanti ed risk value of a hypothesis (hypothesized scenario).
e Hypothesis probability (belief) is a fully quanti ed probability value of a hypothesis. Figure 2 illustrates the concepts de ned above and their relations. In a hypothesis, probabilities and other quantities are aggregated through functional gates all the way up to the root value of a hypothesis which represents its risk value, i.e. the product of the impact of an adverse event and its probability. In the following, we will demonstrate the feasibility of the above approach. As discussed in section 3.1, (say something about that the thing to be demonstrated is not the ability of the method to handle large power systems but multiple domains). We use the test system shown in gure 3 which represents a multi-domain system while keeping the complexity within the individual domains at an absolute minimum, i.e. a simple grid con guration, simple IT network and simple DER behaviour. e test grid con guration consists of a PV inverter connected to an electrical power grid of innite capacity. e inverter can be remote controlled from a laptop (equipped with remote-control so ware) through a minimalistic communication network consisting of a direct, unswitched ethernet connection between a laptop and the controllable inverter. A single inverter function is available through the remote-control interface: Switching the inverter on -which would cause the inverter to feed power to the grid, depending on current solar irradiation -or o , which would reduce the current owing between inverter and grid to exactly zero. e cable between inverter and grid is protected by an in nitely small fuse (here: 1µA) , such that the fuse would inevitably blow and disconnect the inverter from the grid as soon as the inverter is switched on. is reduces the range of possible grid impacts of a cybera ack to a binary choice: Turning the inverter on will result in permanent damage to the system; the associated need for repair is easily quanti able in terms of nancial damage.
e only alternative action is to leave the inverter in the o state, which has no consequences. Starting at the bo om of the tree, the rst two inputs to the resolver are the outputs of the DER intrusion detection tool [DER-IDS] and the vulnerability analysis tool [IT] . Combined, they express the probability of the inverter having been compromised. At the next level, the actions of the a acker must be considered; specically what the a acker intends to do with the compromised system. Due to the design of the test case, the a acker has only two options available: switch the inverter on, or leave it o . ese two options, while the probabilities for their respective occurrences may be known, lead to a widely di erent outcome for the physical system. erefore, two di erent hypotheses must be generated from the hypothesis template, and each outcome must be evaluated separately. For each hypothesis, the response of the inverter to a acker behaviour must be evaluated using a component model of the inverter [DER-CM]. e output of the component model is twofold and consists of (a) the magnitude of the electrical current at the inverter terminals in case of the inverter switching on, and (b) the probability of the inverter switching on a er receiving a remote switching command. e current magnitude is then inserted into a system model [PS] which calculates the line ow between inverter and grid connection, thereby determining the current through the fuse. By comparing this result with the fuse characteristics, it can be transformed into the probability of an inverter operation causing a fuse blow, which in turn can be combined with the probability of an inverter operation to yield the probability of a fuse blow. Independent of the la er, deduction-based result, a blown fuse may also be observed by a system monitoring the state of the physical system in real time [SSM] . e disjunction of both yields the overall probability of a blown fuse. Multiplication with the calculated impact -here expressed as the nancial damage caused by the required replacement of the fuse -yields the risk value. e scenario presented above is very simplistic. Nevertheless, the application of more complex scenarios is not expected to lead to notably greater tree depths in the hypothesis template. Rather, they will lead to increased width of the trees, as the multiplicity of components in a physical system is taken into account. A practical assessment system would be built around a library of hundreds or thousands of di erent hypothesis templates and perform reevaluation on a continuous basis.
is would provide a human operator or another information system with a frequently updated set of the most threatening scenarios according to the present state of the power grid and its cyber infrastructure.
PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION
As part of the SALVAGE project, the process of hypothesis generation (expansion) from a hypothesis template, as well as the evaluation and ranking of multiple hypotheses, has been automated by developing a generic framework. Figure 5 shows the high-level architecture of this framework. A hypothesis template (represented by a hierarchically structured le) is given as input to a hypothesis generator. e generator analyzes the template and extracts a list of branch points which require expansion into multiple hypotheses. Furthermore, the generator identi es the type of information represented by the root node and instantiates an appropriate ranking algorithm for this type of node. As a next step, the generator expands the template at all n b branch points by lling in one of the possible states at each branch point, thus sequentially generating 2 n b hypotheses. Currently, this simple brute-force approach to hypothesis generation/expansion is the only available strategy. Each hypothesis is being forwarded to a resolver module which must match the hypothesis template. e resolver module traverses the tree and identi es the dependencies between ordinary tree nodes and data obtained by executing one of the domain-speci c tools (e.g. a power system impact analysis). At each point of the tree traverse where such external input is needed, a data request is forwarded to the tool orchestrator module which coordinates the execution of one or more domain-speci c tools, prepares the input data for these tools and collects their output. e execution of each individual tool is encapsulated into an executor module to isolate the rest of the framework from tool-speci c execution modes such as shell invocations, platform dependencies etc. Once the tree has been traversed, the value of the root node is passed on to the ranking module, which applies the ranking criteria provided by the hypothesis generator. e ranking module will only terminate when the last hypothesis has been generated and resolved. Its output is a list of (the highest ranking) hypothesis ordered by their risk value. 
CONCLUSION
In the above paper we have discussed and presented an approach for the integration of cybersecurity tools from multiple domains into an overall risk assessment tool which takes the complex interactions between domains in smart grid systems into account. We have also presented a very simple example case to serve as a proof of concept of the chosen approach, as well as a generic so ware framework for the processing of hypothesis templates. Both the solution approach and the so ware implementing it are currently at an early stage of development.
e next logical development step is the application of the method to a more complex and more realistic scenario. A case has been developed in the SALVAGE project which investigates possible a acks on the con guration of protection devices in a medium voltage grid. e creation of an appropriate hypothesis template for this system is planned. is template will include several branching points, allowing the investigation of practical methods for mitigating the "explosion of hypotheses". e applicability of the presented approach will to a signi cant degree depend on solutions for this issue. Further down the road, the partial automation of hypothesis template design presents an interesting challenge. Currently, hypothesis templates have to be hand-cra ed by a group of domain experts covering all domains. Identifying some low-hanging fruits to reduce the e ort would strengthen the viability of the approach.
